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ABSTRACT 
 
We apply the target revenue model, a version of prospect theory, to investigate how fishermen 
adjust their trip length to changes in daily revenue. The key finding is that certain groups of 
fishermen seem more likely to behave according to the target revenue model rather than the 
standard model of labor supply. We also find that vessel capacity has little effect on whether the 
captains seek target revenue. The study strongly supports the integration of prospect theory into 
the framework of labor supply analysis. 
 
Key Words: Behavioral economics in fisheries; Hawaii Longline; Prospect Theory; Target 
revenue model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fishing effort, as measured by the number of fishing days for a given trip, is probably one of the 
most important decisions for any fisherman.  Studies on fishing effort have been widely 
published.  To the best of our knowledge, most of these studies use the standard assumptions of 
economic theory, namely that economic agents are rational and self-interested. In this paper, we 
explore the fishermen’s decision-making behavior on the number of fishing days per trip by 
applying an alternative framework using the target revenue model1.  We will see how having a 
target revenue2 may influence the fishermen’s decision regarding trip length and how this may 
result in a different prediction from the standard economic model regarding the relationship 
between daily fishing revenue and the number of fishing days. To investigate which model 
provides a more reasonable description of reality, we observe the empirical evidence from the 
Hawaii-based longline fisheries respond.  
Regarding the literature on labor supply, the question of how much workers response to 
change in wages is fundamental. Recent studies have moved towards analyzing an alternative 
determinant of labor supply hypothesis that deviates from the conventional framework: 
reference-dependent preferences (see Kahneman and Tversky 2000 for a selection of papers on 
this topic). With such preferences, an individual’s utility for any given period depends on a target 
for income: if income falls below this target, then the workers marginal utility of income is 
higher than if income is above the target. Hence, a temporary increase in earnings may (but not 
necessarily) lower labor supply because the desired reference-income can then be achieved with 
less work effort. 
                                                 
1 Only few studies including Holland  & Sutinen (2000), and Holland (2008) consider irrational aspects of 
fishermen’s decision making behavior. 
2 We use revenue target interchangeably with income target in this paper. 
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There are factors that make fisheries an interesting case study. First, anecdotal evidence 
seems to suggest that fishermen may exhibit income targeting behavior (Holland, 2008; Lynham, 
Siegel and Costello, 2007). However, there has been no empirical study to investigate this 
evidence. Second, fishermen face capacity constraints for fuel and food supplies. These 
constraints may result in shortening the trip despite not having achieved the target revenue goal 
for a given trip as predicted by the target revenue model.  Third, Hawaii based longline fisheries 
consists of owners from different ethnic groups, each one potentially behaving differently in the 
decision-making process. Accordingly, certain groups of owners may be more likely to behave in 
accordance with the standard economic model; whereas the others are more likely to behave 
according to the target revenue model. Finally, Hawaii’s longline fishermen generally vary in 
terms of fishing experience which allows for estimation of correlation between experience and 
observed behavior. 
As far as fishery management is concerned, the idea that the fishermen seek target revenue 
could have important policy implications. First, to achieve the target the fishermen may be 
willing to make risky and unsafe decisions. For instance, due to stormy conditions, it may take 
longer for the vessel to achieve the target.  Thus, the captain may be willing to prolong the trip 
rather than return to port despite the storm. That decision would threaten the lives of the whole 
crew. Likewise, the fishermen may be willing to take the risk of being fined so they can fish in 
the restricted area in order to achieve the preset target. Along this line, Holland (2008) suggests 
that fishery management officials may consider two alternatives in establishing compliance 
strategies: policies with high probability of detection and moderate fine or policy with low 
probability of detection and high fine.   
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Another relevant aspect of revenue targeting to fishery management relates to a popular 
policy experiment aiming at preventing further entry and rebuilding the stock once the fishing 
stock reaches a steady state. Given this scenario, Lynham, Siegel and Costello (2007), using a 
simulation model, show that in a fishery, which includes both income maximizers and income 
targetters, incumbent fishermen wouldn’t be better off by closing the fishery and rebuilding the 
stock. Accordingly, fishermen rarely support such policy proposal (Lynham, Siegel and  
Costello, 2007).     
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
literatures which have a special focus on the target revenue model in fisheries.  We then present a 
simple model of target revenue model in a fishery. Next, we are going to investigate the 
following questions:  1. How well does the target revenue model describe the fishing behavior of 
Hawaii longline fishermen? (2) How do capacity constraints impact fishermen’s behavior under 
the target revenue model framework?  We then conclude the paper.  
 
II. A      LITERATURE   REVIEW 
 
A great number of recent studies on labor supply have followed the inter-temporal 
formulation of the standard neoclassical model (Camerer et al., 1997; Chou, 2003; Farber, 2005). 
The model predicts, under the standard framework, that there is a positive correlation between 
the number of working hours and wage rate.   
Studies on the supply of labor have empirically shown little support for the standard 
model’s prediction (Falk, 2004 and 2006). Though most studies have found a positive correlation 
between labor wages and labor supply, the results are not significant.  This insignificant 
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relationship found in the empirical studies can be attributed to a number of factors. For instance, 
in many settings workers are required to work a fixed number of hours per day regardless of their 
hourly wage (Falk, 2004).  Another question is whether changes in wages are temporary or 
permanent with respect to the time horizon of the decision-making framework.  Under the 
standard model of labor supply, decisions are made under a long-run or lifelong horizon.   
Most empirical studies in fisheries, however, assume that decision making is short-term 
(i.e., a fishing trip). This short-run time horizon, for example, certainly impacts on the standard 
model’s predictions of fishermen’s behavior (Eggert and Lokina, 2007).  In a seminal paper, to 
describe fishery captains’ labor supply behavior, Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley (1996) develop a 
model that highlights both contemporaneous and inter-temporal trade-offs between labor and 
leisure. They then test the theory based on data from a sea-scallop fishery. The key finding is that 
the short-run labor supply exhibits backward bending property. More specifically, captains were 
found to increase time at sea and decrease time onshore in response to higher current-period 
profits per day. At sufficiently high levels of profits per day, captains reduce time at sea and 
increase time onshore. The findings suggest that labor supply is backward-bending in current 
daily profits whereas leisure demand is forward-falling. 
In the search for a model to bridge the gap between theoretical prediction and empirical 
evidence, increasing attention has been paid to the target revenue model which offers an 
alternative description of labor supply. In what follows, we will briefly review the labor supply 
studies based on the target revenue model.     
  
 Revenue Target Model: A Prospect Theory Based Model 
The seminal paper by Camerer et al. (1997) on the labor supply of taxi drivers in New York City 
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is the first study on labor supply under the prospect theory framework. Camerer et al. find a 
negative elasticity for the taxi driver’s working hours with respect to hourly wage in the range of 
[-0.61, -0.18]. According to the authors, the negative relationship between the number of 
working hours and average wage rate results from the fact that each taxi driver has a daily target 
income level.  On a given day, drivers continue driving until they achieve their target income 
levels.  On a productive day with many customers, it takes only a few hours to meet that target 
goal.  Conversely, on days with fewer customers, it takes more hours to reach that same target 
level.  
Following Camerer et al.’s paper, a number of labor supply studies based on the target 
revenue model have been conducted. Using a similar approach, Chou (2002) finds that 
Singaporean cab drivers exhibit exactly the same decision making behavior on time allocation as 
those in New York City.  Fehr and Gotte (2007) provide an innovative method of labor supply 
study. They use a randomized field experiment to explore how bike messengers respond to 
changes in hourly wages.  They estimate the loss aversion parameters of the participants and find 
that messengers with strong loss aversion behaved in accordance with the target revenue model.  
Conversely, messengers with less loss aversion appear to follow the standard model of labor 
supply, i.e., they increase effort levels in response to an increase in the piece rate.  
In support of the standard inter-temporal model, Farber (2005, 2008) conducts a study 
also on New York taxi drivers. Farber’s approach focuses on the probability of continuing to 
drive at any given time by asserting that the greater the number of accumulated driving hours, 
the lower the probability a driver continues to drive. He argues that the key factor in determining 
the cab driver’s daily driving hours is the number of hours driven. Farber finds a positive but not 
significant effect of cumulative earning on the probability of stop driving. This finding is 
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qualitatively consistent with the target income model.  Farber also finds a significant and positive 
impact of cumulative working hours on the probability of stopping which gives support for the 
standard model of labor supply. 
The most recent study by Crawford and Meng (2011) offers a convincing reason for the 
validity of the target revenue model despite Farber’s finding. Based on the framework of 
expectation based reference dependent preferences developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006), 
Crawford and Meng argue that as the workers work longer than the targeted hours they also 
experience loss as income is below the income target level. Crawford and Meng use the same set 
of data and apply the same structural model approach as that utilized by Farber. The important 
distinction is that they consider targets as the agent’s rational expectations rather than the latent 
variables as Farber does. More specifically, Crawford and Meng use the average of realized 
incomes and working hours as a proxy for the targets. Their main finding is that the probability 
of stopping work is determined by income when the realized income is higher than expected as 
supported by the Camerer et al’s. study. When the realized income is less than expected the 
probability is determined by the number of worked hours as shown by Farber. In either case the 
agents are likely to behave according to the target revenue model.      
 
Target revenue model in the context of fisheries 
How relevant is the target revenue model to fisheries? As discussed above, the target 
revenue model is drawn from a literature in which an individual (taxi driver) makes optimizing 
choices that are self-interested. The decision making process in a fisheries context is a bit more 
complicated. Most fishing vessels, including those in the longline fishery, employ three kinds of 
labor: owner, captain and crew. However, in the context of this study (Hawaii’s longline fishery) 
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the decision on whether to continue fishing or return to port is made by the owner and captain3. 
Like Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley (1996), we assume that to remain employed, captains make 
the same choices that owners would have made. Put differently, we can think of a vessel owner / 
captain as an individual decision maker just like a taxi driver. 
The main reason that allows fisheries to serve as an ideal application for the target 
revenue model is probably the short time horizon of the decision making process and the 
uncertainties surrounding each trip.  Decisions on the length of a fishing trip are made one trip at 
a time.  This short time horizon differs from the standard model’s assumption of using a lifelong 
horizon.  There is also a great deal of uncertainty surrounding each trip as it is possible that a 
vessel can have a highly profitable trip followed by a very unprofitable trip, and the reasons may 
be due to uncontrollable factors such as bad weather or poor fishing grounds.  Due to these 
reasons, it is not easy for a vessel operator to expect a certain return for each fishing trip and, 
thus, the operator also will not know how long each trip will last. A possible strategy for the 
vessel operator is to establish a target revenue goal. This goal acts as a reference point to help 
decide whether to continue the fishing trip or not.  
 From interviews with vessel operators in the Hawaii longline fisheries, we found that a 
majority of vessel operators have a mentally constructed target revenue goal for each fishing trip. 
The target revenue is typically the vessel’s average trip revenue realized in previous years.  For 
example, operators of average size longline vessels mentioned aiming for a revenue of $20,000 
per trip. Once the operator has reached this goal, he would very likely conclude the trip and 
return home.  The probability of continuing the fishing trip after achieving $19,000 is much 
greater than continuing after receiving $21,000 of revenue. Psychologically, it is true that people 
                                                 
3 Most crews in Hawaii based longline fishery are paid by a fixed wage regime. The owner is responsible for all the 
trip’s expenditures including food supply for the crew and captain. The captain’s wage usually accounts for 40% to 
50% of the net trip’s profit.  
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are more likely to work harder prior to reaching a goal than after exceeding that goal (Fehr and 
Falk, 2002).  Following Goette et al. (2004) insight, we can say that this type of decision-making 
behavior makes the Kahneman–Tversky prospect theory a relevant framework in our study.  
There are also other features that make fisheries an interesting case for the study of labor 
supply under the target revenue model.  First, fishermen have flexibility to choose their work 
schedules (Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley, 1996) which in turn allows for variability in the number 
of fishing days between trips and vessels. Variation in the number of fishing days makes it 
possible to use trip length as the dependent variable. Second, a typical feature of decision making 
in longline fishery is to consider each fishing trip in isolation.  If the vessel operator made 
decisions based on two trips as opposed to one, for instance, the additional revenue from one 
productive trip could offset the loss in the other unproductive trip.  In order to reach the revenue 
target for the two trips, the vessel operator may fish longer during the productive trip and shorter 
during the unproductive trip.  Despite having a revenue target (for the two trips together), the 
vessel operator’s behavior follows in suit with the inter-temporal model of labor supply.  
 
Other considerations 
   In general, the fishing trip length decision is complex due to a number of factors, 
including vessel capacity and auction fish prices. Vessel physical capacity determines the length 
of time that a vessel can fish. The ability to produce ice during a trip is crucial in lengthening the 
amount of time a vessel is out at sea.  Fish price, which is controlled by market supply and 
demand forces, can directly impact trip revenue and induce uncertainty regarding trip length. 
Fish prices are determined by a high level of competition at the local United Fishing Agency fish 
auction and are also influenced by the number of fishing boats choosing to offload on a particular 
 10 
day.  Depending on the number of boats offloading to the fish auction, vessel operators may 
gamble by shortening a trip and catching fewer pieces of fish, and offloading on a day when 
fewer boats are at the auction in hopes of securing higher prices to compensate for the lower 
quantity in fish pieces. 
This paper greatly simplifies the complex process above by assuming that the vessel 
operator has a revenue target, as opposed to a target quantity of fish pieces caught. This 
assumption may cause one to ask how the vessel operator can estimate the accumulated revenue 
of the trip especially when the auction fish price fluctuates on a daily basis.  This is possible 
thanks to the constant communication between the captain who is monitoring the boat in the 
ocean and the owner who closely follows what happens at the auction.  Focusing solely on 
revenue rather than on fish prices will significantly simplify this complex price mechanism. 
Regarding the vessel’s physical constraint to stay longer in the ocean, we use ice maker and 
vessel size as a proxy for vessel capacity. Having an ice maker enables larger and typically 
shallow-set vessels to fish longer, as does being a larger vessel.  When fish are placed in an ice 
hold and regularly repacked to maintain a desired level of freshness over the course of many 
weeks out at sea, ice will melt and will have to be replaced by fresh ice from an ice maker.  
Otherwise, there exists a trade-off between the fish quality and the trip length.   
 
III.  A REVENUE TARGET MODEL IN FISHERY 
 
Our primary interest is seeing how having a target revenue goal impacts trip length.  Decisions 
on trip length are made one trip at a time rather than over an entire lifecycle.  Hence, our model 
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is based on a single trip.  To incorporate revenue targeting, we build upon Farber (2008) to  
assume that the captain’s preference takes the following form: 
 
U w,d( ) =
wd -T( )-
q
1+g
d1+g             if   wd > T
l wd -T( )-
q
1+ g
d1+g          if   wd < T
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
                                                            (1)                                  
where 
 U (w,d)
 is the utility function under prospect theory and d is the number of fishing days,  
w is the average daily fish revenue. T is the reference (target) revenue level. l  is a parameter 
representing how sensitive the captain is to deviation from the reference revenue.  We assume 
 l >1 to reflect loss aversion.  θ is a parameter for the disutility of fishing effort (θ>0).  γ is the 
inverse elasticity parameter of revenue with respect to fishing days (γ>0).   
There are two elements in the utility function. The first element represents utility, which 
varies depending on how much the actual fishing revenue exceeds the target (wd-T). The second 
element is the standard disutility function. The utility function is kinked at wd=T.  When the 
captain exceeds the catch revenue level (wd>T), the marginal utility is 1, which implies that a 
revenue increase of $1 results in a 1 unit increase in utility.  When the captain has not exceeded 
the catch revenue level (wd<T), the marginal utility is l , which is greater than 1, which implies 
that a revenue increase of $1 leads to more than a 1 unit increase in utility.  In this case, the 
captain places more value on a $1 revenue increase because the captain has yet to reach the point 
where wd>T and, thus, is more willing to continue fishing.  A productive fishing trip shortens the 
time in which the captain can achieve the target goal (i.e. wd>T), whereas an unproductive trip 
lengthens the time the captain has to achieve the target goal as there is incentive to fish longer as 
long as wd<T.   Intuitively, this depicts the negative relationship between daily fishing revenue 
and trip length.  We will formally show under what circumstance this relationship will occur.        
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Case 1:  wd <T    
From (1), we can express the prospect utility function as follows:  
 
U (w,d) = l(wd -T )-
q
1+ g
d1+g                                                                                         (2) 
Solving the first order condition (FOC) for d to optimize the captain’s utility, we have: 
 
¶U (w,d)
¶d
= 0 Û lw = q(d*)g Û d* =
lw
q
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1/g
                                                                        (3) 
The above optimal value for 
 d  has to satisfy the condition wd*<T
. Substituting  
 
d*=
lw
q
æ
èç
ö
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1/g
 this condition becomes w
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ö
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In summary, 
 
given w< w
-
 we can derive the labor supply function to be 
 
d*=
lw
q
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1/g
 
Case 2:  wd >T    
In this case,  l =1, and the captain’s utility becomes: 
 
U (w,d) = (wd -T )-
q
1+ g
d1+g                       
Solving the FOC for d, we have 
 
d** =
w
q
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1/g
. This optimal value of d has to satisfy the condition    
 
 
wd** >T Þ w
w
q
æ
èç
ö
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1/g
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g
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1
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-
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g
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1
1+g       
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In summary, 
 given w > w
-
 we can derive the labor supply function to be   
Case 3:  wd =T   
Case 3 also corresponds the the case in which the daily revenue satisfies the condition: 
 
w
-
< w < w
-
 . Put differently, the  labor  supply  is  
 
d =
T
w
 given w
-
< w < w
-
.    
 
From cases 1, 2, and 3 we can derive the labor supply function of the captain as follows: 
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where 
 
w
-
º T
1+g
g q1+g  and w
-
º T
1+g
g q
l
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1+g
. 
In addition to the postive relationship between daily revenue and labor supply as 
predicted by standard models of labor supply, we can see that this relationship is negative when 
 
wÎ w
-
,w
-æ
èç
ö
ø÷
. Thus, the revenue target model can address a broader range of impacts that daily 
revenue may have on the fishing trip length.  Under the revenue target model, it is plausible that 
an increase in daily fishing revenue results in shorter trips.  The following section empirically 
explores how closely the revenue target model describes the behavior of Hawaii longline 
fishermen.  
 
 
d** =
w
q
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1/g
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CHARACTERISTICS OF HAWAII BASED LONGLINE FISHERY 
 
 
Longline fishery in Hawaii can be characterized as a multi-species targeted fishery. The industry 
was first introduced by Japanese immigrants in early 1900s. For a relatively long time, the fleet 
had included a small number of vessels with simple technology. Significant change happened in 
the late 1980s when there was a large number of high capital intensive vessels from the mainland 
entering Hawaii’s logline fishery. The number of active vessels has also been on the rise. There 
are 135 active longline vessels at this moment. Table 1 presents basic characteristics of vessels 
surveyed in the 2004 Hawaii-based longline technology survey. As can be seen from the Table 1, 
Hawaii longline vessels vary greatly in most of the basic characteristics. Some vessels are very 
large and capital intensive, while others are small and more labor intensive. Some vessels were 
built around the 1940s while some were built just few years ago. Variations in vessels’ 
characteristics may result in large standard deviation of catch per trip and trip’s revenue. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
Data Source and Model Specifications 
 
 
Information on the number of fishing days by trip and trip revenue is obtained from 2004 
logbook data and 2004 auction data, respectively.  It is worth noting that the swordfish fishery 
had been closed in Hawaii for the previous two years and was re-opened in 2004 under a “set 
cap” program. Given this special feature of Hawaii’s swordfish fishery, our data includes 
information on tuna fishery only. Hereafter, longline fishery refers to only the tuna fishery. The 
logbook is compiled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  The 
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auction data is collected by the Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources (HDAR).  The logbook 
data contains information on the number of fishing days for every longline trip in 2004, and the 
auction data records the trip revenue for each longline vessel in that same year.  These two 
datasets were combined for the estimation of the empirical model. 
It is worth noting that there are a number of limitations with the data that make it difficult 
to parse the underlying reason for the observed data patterns i.e., a lack of information on 
dockside prices or contractual shares. Thus, we are cautious when drawing inference from the 
associated results. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. The average length of a 
fishing trip in the Hawaii longline fishery is about 19 days.  Variation of the number of fishing 
days is relatively large.  An average vessel earns about $32,000 per trip or $1,800 per fishing 
day.   
The standard deviations in fish revenues are relatively large, reflecting the diversity of 
vessel characteristics within the fisheries. About 50% of captains have 16 years of longline 
fishing.  In terms of the vessel’s capacity, about 35% of vessels have an ice maker.   
  
Model Specifications 
 
Given that the number of fishing days is count data one can use a generalized linear 
model such as a Poisson model to investigate the relationship between the number of fishing 
days and daily revenue.  In this study, we are more interested in the elasticity of fishing day with 
respect to daily revenue, thus we take the log of fishing days, in turn making the dependent 
variable continuous. We then use a standard linear model accordingly. Our approach is the same 
as those studies on the taxi drivers e.g., Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002). To check the 
robustness of the results, we also run the Poisson model. As can be seen from Table 3, the 
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finding indicates a more significant negative relationship between number of fishing days and 
daily revenue than other model specifications. 
We then start with the basic empirical model, which takes the following form:   
 
ln D
it
=h ln w
it
+ X
it
b +e
it
                                                                                    (5) 
where 
it
D  represents the number of fishing days by vessel  i on trip t, 
 
w
it
 is the average daily 
revenue of vessel i on trip t, Xit are the vessel’s characteristics that may impact the trip’s fishing 
length; εit is the standard error term.  Camerer et al. (1997) point out that this method of 
estimating 
 
w
it
 is very similar to that used in the labor supply literature, where wage rate is 
estimated by dividing yearly (monthly) income by yearly (monthly) working hours.  Thus,   is 
interpreted as the daily revenue elasticity. 
We include a binary variable indicating the presence of an ice maker as well the vessel’s 
length to proxy for the vessel’s capacity to stay longer in the ocean; hereafter we term it “staying 
power”.  To account for the high demand of fish during the holiday season, we use a binary 
variable to represent the holiday seasons on Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
In terms of model specification, ideally one should look at the daily revenue in a given 
trip.  This makes it possible to estimate the accumulated revenue at any given fishing day.  The 
cumulative revenue is the deciding factor influencing whether the captain continues to fish or 
not.  However, we do not have information on daily revenue for each individual fishing trip, thus 
we use the average daily revenue instead as the independent variable.  
The use of the average daily revenue may cause potential measurement error.  Camerer et 
al. (1997) and Chou (2002) in their studies on taxi drivers mention that there may have been 
measurement errors in the recorded number of driving hours.  This problem is known as division 
bias in labor economics studies (Borjas, 1980).  Likewise, one may suspect potential 
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measurement errors in the number of fishing days compiled in the logbook. If such is the case, 
inflated records may increase the number of fishing days and deflate average trip revenue, while 
deflated records may decrease the number of fishing days and inflate average trip revenue.  Both 
cases of misreporting fishing days lead to spurious negative elasticity.  On the other hand, the 
daily revenue elasticity may be biased towards zero due to an over reporting of total trip revenue.  
These two sources of bias will either reinforce or counteract each other, depending on whether 
the true daily revenue elasticity is positive or negative. Therefore, the net effect is uncertain. 
In the fisheries context, the logbook contains the record of the number of fishing days 
made by each vessel, as it is required by law for fishermen to complete their logs.  After every 
trip, NOAA collects the logbook directly from the captain and ensures that key information, such 
as fishing days, is recorded correctly. Thus, the data quality, particularly regarding fishing trip 
days, is quite accurate.  Potential measurement errors are more likely to come from the trip 
revenue data.  
Greene (2004) points out that measurement error in the dependent variable is less serious 
than in the independent variable. Accordingly, we will mainly focus on correcting potential 
measurement errors in the independent variable (i.e. the daily revenue). The corrections are made 
by finding an appropriate instrumental variable.  Given the data available, we use the average 
daily fish revenue of other vessels landing on the same day as the instrument for daily revenue.  
In theory, a good instrument has the covariance of zero, or is unrelated to total fishing days, and 
has a strong correlation with the daily revenue of the concerned vessel. We believe that the 
chosen variable has minimal or no impact on the captain’s decision to adjust the trip length 
(dependent variable) and is not highly correlated with the error terms in the trip length equation.  
We have also found that the greater (lower) the daily revenue of other vessels, the higher (lower) 
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the daily revenue of the concerned vessel since they face the same market conditions at the 
auction.  Understandably, this interpretation is made under the assumption that there is not much 
variation in the fishing conditions. 
Another practical consideration is whether the chosen instrument is strong. Cameron and 
Trivedi (2006) point out that the weak IV estimator may be markedly biased in finite samples 
even though it is asymptotically consistent.  To check whether or not the instrument variable is 
weak,  we use the Cragg-Donald Wald statistics, which is a F statistic in the first stage of the 
2SLS model, and compare it with the Stock-Yoko (2005) critical values to check whether the 
instrumental variable is weak or not.  The Cragg-Donald Wald statistics of 21.75 from our 2SLS 
model indicate a reasonably strong instrumental variable. 
We realize that the above chosen instrumental variable is not perfect in any way. That 
being said, we believe that it is the best instrumental variable (IV) we can have given the data at 
hand. Also, we present both models with and without the instrumental variables in all analyses to 
check whether the findings are consistent.   
 As a final comment in this section, note that our data has the underlying panel 
structure.  Following Stock and Watson (2006), we cluster standard errors (SEs) at the vessel 
level to have SEs that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation. 
 
Main Empirical Results 
Table 3A presents the results of the estimation from OLS, 2SLS and fixed effect with 
instrumental variable models. The key finding is that daily fishing revenue has a negative and 
significant impact on the number of fishing days in all models.  That is, the higher the daily 
revenue is, the shorter the fishing trip.  This finding is consistent with the taxi drivers studies by 
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Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002).  From Heath, Larrick, and Wu’s insights (1999), we can 
infer that fishermen seem more motivated to reach the revenue target rather than to surpass it. 
Consistent with what we show in the appendix, the absolute value of the estimated 
revenue elasticity for the 2SLS model is marginally greater than the OLS. This result implies that 
there may be marginal measurement error in the instrumental variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2006).   In comparison with the Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) studies, the elasticity of 
labor supply with respect to daily revenue in the fisheries is smaller in magnitude. The smaller 
elasticity may reflect that fishermen have less flexibility in choosing the length of a fishing trip 
due to the vessel capacity constraints. 
In addition to daily revenue, other variables also have significant and expected effects on 
the number of fishing days. Bigger vessels, as indicated by having greater length, are capable of 
longer fishing trips.  From the estimations, we can also infer that trip length is significantly 
shorter during the holiday seasons.  One possible reason is that fishermen receive higher profits 
due to higher prices from the increased demand of fish during the holidays. Accordingly, there is 
an incentive to shorten the fishing trip, in exchange for increasing the number of fishing trips.  
Before moving on to the next section, it is worth noting that from equation (4) in the 
model, one would expect the captain behave differently depending on the daily revenue level.4  
To verify this prediction empirically, one way is to run the model separately for different sample 
of vessels by their daily revenues. Table 3B shows that majority of fishing trips (588 out of 840) 
indicate a negative correlation between fishing length and daily revenue.  Smaller samples of 
trips show a positive correlation; however, the findings are not significant. Overall, the results 
                                                 
4 We thank a referee for making this suggestion. 
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seem consistent with the model’s prediction and with those presented in Table 3A for the sample 
as a whole.  
 
VI.  CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE REVENUE TARGET MODEL 
 
Vessel captains face capacity constraints that prevent them from fishing past a certain amount of 
time, such as fuel and the preservation of fish quality. Therefore, the prediction of a positive 
revenue elasticity by the standard model of labor supply may not apply to fishing vessels because 
their capacity constraints are lower.  For instance, the captain might decide to return to the dock 
even in a good trip to preserve the fish’s freshness. To proxy for the dependence of vessels on 
capacity constraint, we use a “staying capacity” binary variable to indicate whether the vessel 
has an ice-maker and has a median or greater length5. Because of their less dependence on 
capacity constraints, high capacity vessels are more likely to behave according to the standard 
model of labor supply provided the standard model correctly describes Hawaii’s longline 
captains’ fishing behavior.  
Table 4 summarizes statistics of vessels by staying capacity. As expected, vessels with 
high staying capacity fish longer than low capacity vessels though the difference is insignificant.  
High staying capacity vessels are also more profitable on a per trip and per day basis.   
To investigate the effect of capacity constraints on fishing behavior under the target 
revenue framework, we run the regression models by the vessels’ staying capacity (Table 5). The 
results suggest that both groups of vessels with high and low staying capacity seem to behave in 
accordance with the target revenue model. Also, the difference in daily revenue elasticity among 
                                                 
5 We also use the vessel width and a combination of the vessel width and length as a proxy for its staying capacity. 
The results are basically the same. 
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these two groups of vessels is not statistically significant by Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). Put differently, Hawaii’s longline captains follow the same fishing behavior 
independent of vessel’s “staying capacity”.   
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we attempt to provide another perspective within the existing labor supply 
literature. We developed a simple target revenue model to show, under certain conditions, that 
increases in daily fishing revenue lead to decreases in trip length.  Using different model 
specifications, we found a significantly negative correlation between daily revenue and the trip 
length. The more productive their fishing trip is, the shorter the captains will choose to make 
their fishing trip. This finding implies that Hawaii fishermen tend to have a revenue target for 
their fishing trips. Our study, like Camerer et al. (1997), Chou (2002), and Fehr and Goette 
(2004, 2006), highlights the relevance of integrating prospect theory into the framework of labor 
economics.  
We also investigated how unique features of the fisheries impact fishermen’s behavior 
under the target revenue framework.  We separated the vessels into groups by their staying 
capacity.  We found that Hawaii’s longline captains follow the same fishing behavior 
independent of vessel’s “staying capacity”.  
An interesting finding is that the revenue target model seems to fit the data better. This is 
consistent with other studies showing that prospect theory is a better description of individual 
preference than expected utility. Given that fishermen have the flexibility of choosing working 
duration, having a target of revenue plays a key role in deciding the fishing trip length. By 
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incorporating the target revenue, the prospect theory gives a better description of decision 
making behavior in fisheries and occupations that share similar nature of work duration 
flexibility such as taxi driving.  
This paper can be improved in a number of aspects. The use of an imperfect instrumental 
variable may lead to less biased estimations at the expense of an efficiency loss. In some 
estimations, the results from the 2SLS model became less significant than the OLS due to 
increase in the standard errors. An approach based on a system of structural equations and 
natural experiments may help solve this problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006). 
As a potential extension of the paper, we can conduct further field experiments with 
Hawaii longline fishermen to measure the loss aversion parameter for each participant and 
identify a model that best describes the agent’s risk behavior.  Fehr and Goette (2006) suggest 
either a reference dependence model or neoclassical model with non-separable preferences.  
They also find that loss-averse participants are more likely to behave in accordance with the 
target model. Integrating the risk behavior of fishermen under prospect theory, of which loss 
aversion is an important aspect, into the framework of fisheries decision making is a promising 
area in fisheries research. 
Another potential extension of this study is to investigate how well the revenue target 
model performs relative to the hazard model by Farber. In his study of taxi cab drivers, Farber 
(2005, 2008) finds the standard model more favorable than the target revenue model.  Our study 
of the Hawaii longline fisheries reveals that the target revenue model gives robust findings under 
different model specifications.  Accordingly, we believe that our results will probably hold under 
Farber’s approach.  That being said, the current study would be more complete if we could also 
use Farber’s approach to check the robustness of the results. However, we presently do not have 
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information on the daily vessel revenue for a given fishing trip.  Improvement on logbook data 
collection will allow us to investigate the relative performance of the target revenue model 
against the standard model of labor supply.  
 Finally, like Farber (2005, 2008) and  Crawford and Meng (2008), we take targets as 
givens rather than modeling them as endogenously determined. Further analysis on how these 
targets are formed and adjusted over time is a promising direction for future research.   
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TABLE 1:  BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HAWAII  LONGLINE VESSELS 
 
Vessel characteristics 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Current appraisal value ($) 
 
Catch per trip (pound) 
 
Revenue per trip ($) 
 
Age 
 
Length6 (ft) 
 
Average speed 
 
Captain/owner LL experience 
 
Number of crew 
 
Engine horsepower 
 
428,115 
 
12,468 
 
31,294 
 
22 
 
69 
 
7.3 
 
14 
 
5 
 
465 
 
241,000 
 
3,517 
 
8,832 
 
11 
 
11 
 
0.85 
 
9 
 
0.8 
 
202 
 
Source: Report on the 2004 Hawaii based longline fishery technology survey   
                                                 
6 Data is provided by the Coast Guard 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Total  (81 Vessels) 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
Having Ice Maker (1: Yes, 2:No) 
 
Longline Fishing Experience (years) 
 
 
18.77 
 
1794 
 
32,225 
 
0.35 
 
17.13 
 
 
19.00 
 
1648 
 
31,033 
 
0 
 
16 
 
 
5.03 
 
871 
 
14,239 
 
0.47 
 
10.22 
 
  
 29 
TABLE 3A: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY FROM OLS, 2SLS 
AND FIXED EFFECT WITH INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODELS 
          
 OLS   2SLS   FE with 2SLS  
 Coef Std.Err  Coef Std.Err  Coef Std.Err  
Log daily revenue -0.134 0.028 *** -0.211 0.09 ** -0.164 0.082 ** 
Holiday seasons -0.158 0.029 *** -0.147 0.031 *** -0.168 0.032 *** 
Fishing experience 0.015 0.005 *** 0.015 0.005 ***    
Having ice maker -0.025 0.026     0.081 0.051  
Education -0.053 0.019 *** -0.052 0.02 ***    
Caucasian Captains -0.077 0.03 ** -0.061 0.035 * 0.021 0.046  
Length 0.003 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.049 0.019 *** 
Width 0.014 0.006 ** 0.016 0.007 **    
Constant 3.475 0.258 *** 3.992 0.625 ***    
Number of obs 840   840   840   
Adjusted R squared 0.18   0.16   0.16   
 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
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Coef Std.Err Coef Std.Err Coef Std.Err
Log daily revenue 0.012 0.011 -0.24 0.075 *** -0.02 0.12
Controlling for other variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 143 588 109
Adjusted R
2
0.15 0.28 0.16
Daily R < $ 725 $ 725 <Daily R < $ 2338 Daily R >  $ 2338
TABLE 3B: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY FROM OLS BY RANGE 
OF DAILY REVENUE 
 
 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
 
$ 725 and $ 2338 correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile of the daily revenue distribution 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY STAYING CAPACITY 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Low staying capacity  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
High staying capacity  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.68 
 
1724 
 
30881 
 
 
 
19.03 
 
1988 
 
35878 
 
 
19 
 
1603 
 
29877 
 
 
 
19 
 
1820 
 
34449 
 
 
4.85 
 
838 
 
13616 
 
 
 
5.47 
 
929 
 
15243 
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Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
 
